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One feature of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a deficit in verbal reference production; i.e., 
providing an appropriate amount of verbal information for the listener to refer to things, people, and 
events. However, very few studies have manipulated whether individuals with ASD can take a 
VSHDNHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLQRUGHUWRLQWHUSUHWYHUEDOUHIHUHQFH. A critical limitation of all interpretation 
studies LVWKDWFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIDQRWKHU¶VYHUEDOUHIHUHQFHUHTXLUHGWKHSDUWLFLSDQWto represent only 
WKHRWKHU¶Vvisual perspective.  Yet, many everyday interpretations of verbal reference require 
knowledge of social perspective (i.e., a consideration of which experiences one has shared with which 
interlocutor). 
We investigated whether 22 5;0- to 7;11-year-old children with ASD and 22 well-matched 
typically developing (TD) children used social perspective to comprehend (Study 1) and produce 
(Study 2) verbal reference.  Social perspective-taking was manipulated by having children 
collaboratively complete activities with one of two interlocutors such that for a given activity, one 
interlocutor was Knowledgeable and one was Naïve.  Study 1 found no between-group differences for 
the interpretation of ambiguous references based on social perspective.  In Study 2, when producing 
referring terms, the ASD group made modifications based on listener needs, but this effect was 
significantly stronger in the TD group.  Overall, the findings suggest that high-functioning children 
with ASD know with which interlocutor they have previously shared a given experience and can take 
this information into account to steer verbal reference. Nonetheless, they show clear performance 
limitations in this regard relative to well-matched controls. 
Keywords: Autism, Children, Reference, Common Ground, Verbal Social Communication, 
Production, Comprehension. 
 
Lay summary (Max = 80 words) 
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No-one had studied if young children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) could take into account 
previous collaboration with particular conversation partners to drive how well they communicate with 
others. In both their language understanding and spoken language we found that five to seven-year-
olds with ASD were able to consider what they had previously shared with the conversation partner. 
However, they were impaired when compared to typically-developing children in the degree to which 
they tailored their spoken language for a specific listener. 
 
Introduction  
The diagnostic criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) include deficits in verbal social 
communication (APA, DSM-5, 2013). A distinctive characteristic of verbal social 
communication among indiviGXDOVZLWK$6'LVDQLPSDLUPHQWLQµDXGLHQFHGHVLJQ¶9ROGHQ
2002), the DELOLW\WRSURYLGHDQDSSURSULDWHDPRXQWRILQIRUPDWLRQIRUWKHOLVWHQHU¶V
informational needs (Clark & Marshall, 1981). For example, if a speaker wants a particular 
loaf at the bakery, then a complex referring expression VXFKDVµthe biggest loaf¶could be 
appropriately informativeZKHUHDVUHTXHVWLQJµWKHEUHDG¶ZRXOGEHXQGHU-informative.  
However, at dinner with only one loaf of bread, asking for µWKHbig loaf¶would be over-
informative. A deficit in audience design is likely to contribute to difficulties with peer 
popularity (see e.g. Rubin, 1972; Gottman, Gonso & Rassmussen 1975) and reciprocal 
conversation (e.g. Fine, Bartolucci, Szatmari & Ginsberg, 1994). Use of under-informative 
referring expressions, in particular, leads to breakdowns in the ability to make successful 
requests (e.g. Matthews, Lieven & Tomasello, 2007).  
 The degree to which an expression is appropriate depends on consideration of the 
knowledge sKDUHGEHWZHHQVSHDNHUDQGOLVWHQHUUHIHUUHGWRDVµFRPPRQJURXQG¶&ODUN
1996). Moll and Kadipasaoglu (2013) distinguish between visual common ground, which 
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requires a consideration of whether the interlocutor can see particular items, and social 
common ground, which requires a consideration of the experiences the individual has 
previously shared with the interlocutor. They argue that visual perspective-taking may not 
require an in-GHSWKFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKHLQWHUORFXWRU¶VPHQWDOVWDWHVDny 
interlocutor positioned behind a barrier will not be able to see a particular object. In contrast, 
social common ground is interlocutor-specific. Prior joint engagement and collaboration are 
argued to be crucial in determining social common ground for typically-developing (TD) 
children (Kern & Moll, 2017; Rakoczy, 2017; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 
2005). For example, if a speaker and interlocutor have been collaborating by using a specific 
hammer to put DWR\WRJHWKHUWKHQWKHVLPSOHUHIHUULQJH[SUHVVLRQLQµ3DVVthe hammer¶LV
appropriately informative even when other hammers are visually co-present (e.g. Schmerse, 
Lieven & Tomasello, 2015). 
Compared to TD groups which are well-matched for chronological age, non-verbal IQ 
and formal language (syntax or vocabulary), ASD groups usually under-perform in the 
production of appropriately informative referring expressions during narrative tasks (Colle et 
al., 2008; Suh et al., 2014; Banney, Harper-Hill & Arnott, 2015; Arnold, Bennetto & Diehl, 
2009). The same has been found in production studies that have used interactive experimental 
manipulations of the participant and interlocutor¶V shared visual perspective (e.g. Nadig, 
Vivanti & Ozonoff, 2009; Fukumura, 2016; Dahlgren & Dahlgren Sandberg, 2008; Volden 
Mulcahy & Holdgrafer, 1997; Nadig, Seth & Sassoon, 2015). That said, one study which 
used a very simple narrative elicitation task (Kuijper, Hartman & Hendriks, 2015) found no 
differences between children and adolescents with ASD and TD controls. Moreover, some 
studies have found ± alongside evidence of impairments relative to controls ± indications that 
children and adolescents with ASD show an awareness of listener information needs 
(Makinen et al., 2014; Arnold et al., 2009; Norbury & Bishop, 2003). 
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 In contrast to research on the production of contextually-appropriate verbal reference 
in ASD, there are very few studies manipulating the role of speaker perspective on the 
interpretation of verbal reference, which have included typical controls. ,QDµ'LUHFWRU7DVN¶
where speaker and listener visual perspectives matched (common ground condition) or were 
disparate (privileged ground condition), Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland and Keysar (2010) and 
Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird and Heyes (2015) found no differences in either accuracy, 
response latency or gaze fixations for adults with ASD relative to typical controls. Schuh, 
Eigsti & Mirman (2016) also found no differences between 13-year-olds with ASD and TD 
controls on accuracy measures in a referential communication task requiring participants to 
recall which referents were known to the speaker. The ASD group made more gaze fixations 
to the objects unknown to the speaker (privileged ground condition) than did the TD controls, 
when the task involved a high working memory burden (a larger number of shapes). 
Therefore, it may be that individuals with ASD possess the necessary socio-cognitive 
competence to use common ground to interpret verbal reference but fail to consistently apply 
this competence/knowledge depending on extraneous factors which contribute to task 
difficulty. 
That said, it would be surprising if individuals with ASD really possessed an 
underlying conceptual competence in verbal reference interpretation per se, because this 
ability is usually considered to rely on the Theory of Mind (ToM)/mentalising ability that is 
known to be impaired in ASD (e.g. White, Hill, Happé & Frith, 2009). There are several 
reasons to be cautious when drawing conclusions from the findings of existing studies of 
verbal reference interpretation in ASD.  First, all studies of verbal reference interpretation by 
individuals with ASD have only included adolescents or adults.  Therefore, individuals with 
ASD PLJKWµRXWJURZ¶DQLQLWLDOLPSDLUPHQWLQWKHDELOLW\WRWDNHFRPPRQJURXQGLQWR
account while interpreting verbal reference.  Alternatively, it might be that older adolescents 
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and adults with ASD employ alternative, compensatory stratHJLHVWR³KDFNRXW´VROXWLRQVWR
tests of verbal reference interpretation, in a manner similar to that reported for classic ToM 
tasks (e.g., Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991).  If, however, young children with ASD can in 
principle demonstrate the ability to take the knowledge-state of an interlocutor into account to 
drive verbal reference interpretation or production, then arguments regarding maturation or 
compensatory strategies are difficult to sustain.    
Second, previous studies only assessed the interpretation of verbal reference in the 
context of level one visual perspective taking, namely whether the interlocutor can see the 
referential alternative1. This is problematic, because level one visual perspective taking could 
be carried out by simply using a non-mentalising heuristic, such as following the physical 
line of gaze without giving any in-depth FRQVLGHUDWLRQWRWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHJD]HU¶Vmind. 
(YLGHQFHVXSSRUWLQJWKLVVXJJHVWLRQFRPHVIURP6DQVWLHEDQHWDO¶VVWXG\that found 
no differences for either group between the experimental and a control condition, in which 
the interlocutor was replaced with a camera. Therefore, the results from the studies of Begeer 
et al. (2010), Sanstieban et al. (2015) and the low working memory condition in Schuh et al., 
(2016) cannot be taken as definitive evidence that an ability to use personal common ground 
to interpret verbal reference is spared in ASD. To test this, we need to investigate whether 
individuals with ASD can interpret verbal reference by taking into account social common 
ground, i.e. by considering which previous joint action they have shared with which 
particular interlocutor (Rakoczy, 2017; Kern & Moll, 2017).  
We therefore carried out the first study to manipulate social perspective-taking in the 
context of verbal reference production or interpretation by children with ASD. Indeed, ours is 
the first study of verbal reference interpretation by children with ASD. The mean age of our 
sample is also younger than any study which has investigated verbal reference production in 
ASD; we included children with ASD aged 5;0 to 7;11-years and TD children matched for 
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age, non-verbal IQ, and formal language. For our interpretation experiment (Experiment 1) 
we adapted a social common ground paradigm originally developed for TD children by 
Liebal, Behne, Carpenter and Tomasello (2009). For each experimental trial, each participant 
first collaborated in one activity (e.g. constructing an electric circuit) with one experimenter, 
who then left the room ostensibly to find a missing object (here: a battery) needed to 
complete that activity. Each participant then collaborated in another activity (e.g. putting 
together a remote-controlled car) with another experimenter, who then also left the room 
ostensibly to find a missing object ± the same missing object ± needed to complete that 
activity. For the final component of each trial, one of the two experimenters (the Requester) 
returned to the room, offered the participant the missing object and VDLG³Here it is! Now you 
can do it´. The measure was whether the participant inserted the object into the activity in 
which the participant had engaged with the Requester. To control for the possibility that 
FKLOGUHQPLJKWVHOHFWWKHFRUUHFWUHIHUHQWXVLQJDKHXULVWLFVXFKDVµJRWRWKHDFWLYLW\WKH
person making the request was co-SUHVHQWZLWK¶(e.g. 2¶1HLOO5) we also had a co-
presence only control condition. 
Our verbal reference production experiment (Experiment 2) was elicited by asking the 
same children to re-tell how to construct toys, that they had made as part of the interpretation 
experiment, in two within-subject conditions. One required the participant to re-tell to the 
adult who had completed the task with them (Knowledgeable Listener). The other condition 
required each participant to explain the toy construction to an adult who had not been present 
for this activity (Naïve Listener). If participants engaged in audience design, they should use 
complex referring expressions HJµWKHORQJHODVWLFEDQG¶for the Naïve Listener but simple 
referring expressionVHJµWKHHODVWLFEDQG¶for the Knowledgeable Listener.   
If autistic difficulties with audience design found in naturalistic interaction derive 
primarily from a competence deficit in the ability to take social common ground into account, 
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this would predict that our sample of children with ASD should not differ from chance in our 
interpretation experiment. A competence deficit account would also predict no differences 
between the Knowledgeable and Naïve conditions in the production experiment, since this 
production measure specifically assesses whether participants tailor their selection of 
referring expressions based on shared knowledge 
If, however, naturalistic audience design difficulties are primarily a performance 
issue, this would allow for above-chance performance in the ASD group in the interpretation 
experiment and a difference between the Knowledgeable and Naïve conditions in production. 
Importantly, however, this account would predict an interaction whereby ASD children 
should show a lesser distinction between the two conditions than would the TD children, 
indicating a reduced ability to demonstrate their competence.  
 
Experiment 1: Using social common ground to interpret referring 
expressions. 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-two TD children were recruited through a developmental lab database 
and mainstream schools.  Eleven children with ASD attended specialist provisions for children 
with ASD. The remaining children with ASD were recruited through parent support groups.  
When recruiting children with ASD, parents and teachers were told that the inclusion criteria 
included verbal fluency and knowledge of colour and size adjectives. TD and ASD children 
were matched on chronological age, formal language and non-verbal IQ. To assess formal 
language, we carried out both receptive (the Sentence Structures sub-test) and expressive 
language (the Formulated Sentences sub-test) measures from the Clinical Evaluation of 
Language Fundamentals® - Fifth Edition (CELF®-5, Wiig, Semel & Secord, 2013). Non-verbal 
IQ was assessed using the Pattern Construction and Matrices tasks from the British Ability 
9 
 
Scales (BAS, Elliot & Smith, 2011). Children in the ASD group had been diagnosed either by 
a clinical psychologist or a paediatrician. Parents of children in both groups completed the 
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS, Constantino & Gruber, 2005). Two children with ASD 
were tested but excluded because their SRS T-scores were below the clinical cut-off and two 
TD children were tested but excluded because they scored above this threshold. The 
demographics for the final sample are shown in Table 1 below, which also includes the scaled 
scores for the CELF subtests, the average t-score for non-verbal IQ and between-groups 
differences for tests of First Order Theory of Mind and Advanced Theory of Mind tests (see 
table legend and also supplementary materials). 
 
Table 1. Means (SD in brackets) for participant characteristics 
 ASD (n = 22; 18 
male) 
TD (n = 22; 18 
male) 
  
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  p d 
Chronological Age in Months 78.86 (11.46)  78.77 (11.19)  .98 0.01 
Sentence Comprehension 
CELF®-5 Scaled Score 
10.64 (2.82)  10.05 (1.81)  .41 0.25 
Formulated Sentences CELF®-
5 Scaled Score 
11.14 (3.20)  11.50 (1.87)  .65 0.14 
Non-verbal IQ: British Ability 
Scale T-score1 
48.59 (10.02)  50.30 (8.93)  .54 0.18 
Social Responsiveness Scale T-
score 
82.86 (9.14)  45.38 (6.14)  <.001 4.81 
Theory of Mind First order3: 
max score = 2.0  
1.68 (0.65)  1.95 (0.21)  .07 0.56 
Theory of Mind 2nd order4: 
max score = 2.0  
1.05 (0.9)  1.5 (0.67)  .06 0.50 
Theory of Mind Advanced5: 
max score = 4.0  
0.18 (0.40)  1.09 (1.19)  .002 1.03 
7KLVLVWKHPHDQ7VFRUHRIWKHµ3DWWHUQ&RQVWUXFWLRQ¶YLVXR-VSDWLDOSDWWHUQPDWFKLQJDQGWKHµ0DWULFHV¶
(non-verbal fluid reasoning ability) sub-tests of the British Ability Scales. 3. This is the combined score of 
µ&RQWHQWV)DOVH%HOLHI:HOOPDQ	/LX3HUQHU/HHNDP	:LPPHUDQGWKHµ&KDQJHRIORFDWLRQ¶
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). 4. From Coull, Leekam & Bennett, 2006 ± see supplementary materials. 
5. 7ZRRI+DSSH¶Vµ6WUDQJH6WRULHVLWHPVµ.LWWHQV¶DQGµ'RXEOHEOXII¶ZLWKYRFDEXODU\DGDSWHGIRU





Overall procedure.  The Experiment 1 trials were SUHVHQWHGDVµEUHDNV¶IURPthe standardised 
(non-verbal IQ and formal language) and ToM tests, and were interspersed between them. 
Each trial (experimental and control) involved one pair of activities requiring a unique 
common item to enable completion. There were six pairs of activities in total (see Table 2).  
Each participant completed four experimental trials and two control trials.  The six activity 
pairs were counterbalanced across participants to appear as control trials on an even number 
of occasions. At the end of the experiment, to verify that participants could remember with 
whom they shared social common ground, each child was asked to tell either a parent or 
teacher which activities they had completed with which experimenter. All children 
successfully remembered this. 
 
Procedure. For each trial (for both experimental and control trials), the child first engaged in 
constructing one activity (e.g. putting together the piece of wood for a slingshot) and then 
engaged in the construction of a different activity (e.g. folding and gluing a paper 
woodpecker). Each construction was completed jointly with one experimenter in the absence 
of the other experimenter. At the end of each construction activity, the experimenter with 
whom the child was constructing the activity declared that a key item was missing (here: an 
elastic band) and left the room to find it. The two experimenters were never in the room at the 
same time during both control and experimental trials. 
 
Table 2: Construction activity pairs and common missing items (comprehension measure) 
Activity Pair Activities  .H\µPLVVLQJ¶FRPPRQLWHP  
1 Electric circuit  Battery Battery operated toy car 
2 Paper aeroplane  Glue Certificate 
3 Tumbling bunny  Marble Marble run 




5 Telephone  String Flying fish 




For both experimental and control trials, RQHH[SHULPHQWHUµ5HTXHVWHU¶UHWXUQHGWRWKH
room and stood in a position equidistant to each activity, offering the child an object (e.g. an 
elastic band) saying µ+HUHLWLV1RZ\RXFDQGRLW¶. The experimenter only looked between 
the child and the object (e.g. the elastic band) until the child inserted it in an activity.  The 
visual status of the two activities was equated for both child and the Requester during the 
request (e.g. both activities occluded in opaque boxes). 
In the interaction between Requester and participant prior to the test trial request, the 
Requester had only seen one of the two activities. Thus, if the Requester had previously (i.e. 
prior to leaving the room) only seen the slingshot (and not the woodpecker), the slingshot was 
desLJQDWHGWKHµWDUJHW¶DQGWKHZRRGSHFNHUWKHµIRLO¶IRUWKDWWULDOIf a child asked for 
FODULILFDWLRQWKH5HTXHVWHU¶VUHVSRQVHVZHUHVFULSWHG.  
For both experimental and control trials, we counterbalanced within and across 
participants which of the two experimenters was the Requester, whether the target was 
ORFDWHGWRWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWRUOHIWDQGZKHWKHUWKHDFWLYLW\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK5HTXHVWHUZDVWKH
most recently completed one for the child.  We also counterbalanced across participants the 
order of the activities, which activity of a pair was the target, and whether an activity was 
assigned to the experimental or control condition.  
In the experimental trials, the target activity (e.g. slingshot) had been co-constructed with 
the Requester and the foil activity (e.g. woodpecker) had been co-constructed with the other 
experimenter. In the control trials, in contrast, the target and foil activities were both 
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completed with the non-requesting experimenter one after the other (e.g. non-requesting E 
constructs telephone, leaves room to find string, returns having failed to locate string with 
PDWHULDOVIRUµIO\LQJELUGOHDYHVURRPWRlook again for string). Importantly, in the control 
trials, the Requester had not interacted with the target construction activity. Rather, they had 
entered the room in the absence of the non-requesting experimenter and merely sat next to 
either the first or second construction activity (counterbalanced) whilst completing a puzzle 
with the child. The Requester then left the room, before later returning with the missing item. 
In these control trials the target was the construction activity which the Requester had sat 
next to. Both control trials were carried out after all experimental trials were completed.  
 
Scoring 
In both experimental and control trials, a score of 1 was awarded for selection of the 
target activity (i.e. associated with the Requester) and a score of 0 was awarded for selection 
of the foil. As there were four trials in the experimental condition, the maximum raw score 
per child was 4. Inter-coder agreement for the interpretation experiment was 100% for both 
experimental and control trials. 
 
Bayesian analyses 
$FFRUGLQJ WR -HIIUH\V¶  %D\HV IDFWRUV %)10) > 3 provide firm evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis and values under 1 provide evidence for the null (with values < 0.33 
providing firm evidence).  A BF10 of 3 suggests the alternative hypothesis is three times more 





Co-presence only control trials. The proportion of times that the co-present activity was 
selected in the control trials did not differ between the ASD (M = 0.39, SD = 0.31) and TD 
(M = 0.52, SD = 0.29) groups, t(42) = 1.52, p = .14, d = 0.47, BF10 = 0.74. This is important 
because it indicates that co-presence alone is insufficient for children in either group to 
interpret ambiguous reference.   
 
Experimental trials. For the experimental there was no significant between-group difference in 
the proportion of trials on which children chose the activity that corresponded to the one they 
had undertaken with the experimenter making the ambiguous request (ASD: M = .85, SD = 
0.23; TD: M = .94, SD = 0.15), t(42) = -1.56, p = .13, d = 0.47, BF10 = 0.78). Thus, the two 
groups did not differ from one another in terms of the likelihood that participants would 
correctly interpret ambiguous verbal reference by selecting the activity associated with a 
specific interlocutor, namely the interlocutor with whom they had shared that particular 
activity. Importantly, both groups showed above-chance performance in this experimental 
condition (ASD group: t(22) = 7.28, p < .001; TD group: t(22) = 13.59, p < .001).  
 
Experiment 2: Do children with ASD use audience design in their selection 
of referring terms? 
Participants. Participants were the same as for Experiment 1.  
 
Relationship between Experiments 1 & 2. Four construction activities from Experiment 1, 
QDPHO\µHOHFWULFFLUFXLW¶µWXPEOLQJEXQQ\¶WHOHSKRQH¶DQGµZRRGSHFNHU¶ were used in the 
production task. Experiment 2 trials always followed the Experiment 1 trial that involved the 




addressee how to construct the telephone for the production study.  
 
Design. Both groups participated in two within-subject conditions.  In the Knowledgeable 
condition, each participant explained how to construct a toy to the experimenter with whom 
s/he had made a toy. In the Naïve condition each participant explained how to construct a toy 
to the experimenter who had not been present during the activity. Two construction activities 
were re-told in each condition (counterbalanced), with three target (binary-coded) referents 
for each, resulting in a possible raw score of 6 per condition (see Table 3). Both 
experimenters were Knowledgeable for two activities and Naïve for the other two activities 
for each participant. 
Table 3: List of referents and their competitors (production measure) 
Activity Referent Target  Distractor Total referents 
Electric Circuit  
 
Wires White (with 
clips) 
Black (no clips) 3 (colour, size, 
colour) 
Battery Small (fits) Big (does not fit) 
Battery 
Holder 
Black (works) Yellow (broken) 
Tumbling Bunny  Bunny Big (Too) Small 3 (size, size, 
length) Marbles Small (Too) Big 
Ramp  Long (Too) Short 




will not go 
through) 
3 (colour, size, 
length) 
Blu-tac Big (Too) Small 
String Long (Too) Short 
Woodpecker Woodpecker Green (on card) White (on paper) 3 (colour, size, 
length)  Sellotape Small (sticky) Big (with fluff 
on, will not stick) 







Procedure: Each child instructed how to construct an overall total of four toys. During the 
shared experience phase for each Experiment 1 activity, the experimenter who constructed each 
toy with the child referred to each Experiment 2 WDUJHWUHIHUHQWDQGLWVGLVWUDFWRUHJµZHKDYH
to use the black battery holder EHFDXVHWKH\HOORZRQHLVEURNHQ¶VKRZLQJthe child the broken 
item) as they constructed the given toy. For the activities which were used in the production 
study, one experimenter then told the child that the other experimenter (addressee) would write 
down what the child said and then use those notes to make a replica toy that could be taken 
home by the child.  
To avoid the use of gestures, children provided instructions via a web-cam, whereby 
the child could see the addressee, but it was explained that the addressee could not see the child. 
Simple pictures were provided to remind the child of the steps required in the activity. These 
pictures were not visible to the addressee, who sat in a separate room. Both the addressee and 
the child could see (for each activity) three items (e.g. cup, blu-tac, string) which had referential 
alternatives.  
Each mention of a target referent (e.g. cup, blu-tac, string) was coded as follows. Use 
of complex referring HJµWKHVPDOOEDWWHU\¶; µWKHEDWWHU\WKDWILWV¶ received a score of 1. 
UVDJHRIDVLPSOHQRXQSKUDVHHJµWKHEDWWHU\¶DSURQRXQµLW¶RUFRPSOHWHRPLVVLRQZDV
scored as zero. The dependent variable was the proportion of referring expressions which 
were complex. As there were a total of six referents in each condition (three for each 
construction activity) the maximum raw score for each condition was six. All uses of verbal 
reference during the instruction task were transcribed and coded by the first author. Eighteen 
per cent of the data was also transcribed and coded by an independent rater, who was blind to 




Post-test vocabulary check: On completion of testing, children were asked to describe how 




To examine the extent to which children engaged in audience design during production, 
the mean proportion of complex referring expressions used in the Knowledgeable and Naïve 
listener conditions was examined (see Figure 1).  For context, a proportion score of one in the 
Naïve Listener condition combined with a proportion score of zero in the Knowledgeable 
Listener condition would indicate that participants were tailoring their use of verbal reference 
perfectly to the audience (listener) informational needs.  
A mixed 2 (Group: TD/ASD) × 2 (Listener Knowledge: Knowledgeable/Naïve) 
ANOVA was conducted to compare the mean proportion of complex referring terms used.  A 
significant main effect of Listener Knowledge reflected the use of more complex referring 
terms with a Naïve than a Knowledgeable listener across groups (F(1,42) = 30.55, p = <.001, ߟ௣ଶ=.42 BF10 = 1.40).  The main effect of Group was marginally significant (F(1, 42) = 3.66, p 
= .063, ߟ௣ଶ=.08 BF10 = 1.40), reflecting less use of complex referring terms among ASD than 
comparison participants across conditions. More importantly, the Group × Listener Knowledge 
interaction effect was significant (F (1, 42) = 6.1, p = .02, ߟ௣ଶ=.13, BF10 = 3.37). The TD 
children showed a significant difference between conditions (t(21) = 5.41, p = <.001, d = 1.19, 
BF10 = 1031), indicative of audience design. Importantly, the difference across conditions was 
also significant for the ASD group (t(21) = 2.27, p = .03, d = 0.57, BF10 = 1.83,), suggesting 
WKDWWKH\ZHUHDZDUHRIWKHLUOLVWHQHU¶VLQIRUPDWLRQDOQHHGVDQGPDGHDWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVWKese.  
This indicates the presence of an underlying competence in the ASD group. 
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However, the significant interaction shows that actual performance of the two groups 
clearly differed and between-participants t-tests in each condition separately showed that the 
extent of this audience design was significantly smaller among ASD than TD participants. The 
between-group difference in the number of complex referring terms used in the Knowledgeable 
Listener condition was not significant, t(42) = .38, p = .70, d = 0.12, BF10 = 0.32.  However, 
TD children used significantly more complex referring terms than children with ASD in the 
Naïve condition, t(42) = 2.36, p = .02, d = 0.71, BF10 = 5.15.  Thus, TD participants altered 
their usage of complex referring expressions according to listener needs to a significantly 
greater extent than did participants with ASD. 
 
Figure 1. Proportion usage of complex referring term with knowledgeable and naïve listener 
 
Discussion 
The current study is the first to manipulate the role of social perspective-taking in the 
interpretation / production of verbal reference by children with ASD. This is important 
because a deficit in common ground understanding might not necessarily lead to impairments 
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in auGLHQFHGHVLJQLIWKHVSHDNHUDQGOLVWHQHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHVmerely differ visually 
(Sanstieban et al., 2015; Moll & Kadipasaoglu, 2013). Therefore, we used collaborative tasks 
that manipulated the social common ground shared with an interlocutor.  In Exp 1 (reference 
interpretation) we found that 5;0- to 7;11-year-olds with ASD were above chance in the use 
of interlocutor-specific common ground knowledge to accurately disambiguate referring 
terms and did not significantly differ in this regard from a matched TD control group. In Exp 
2 (production), we also found that children with ASD showed evidence of taking social 
common ground into account; they used significantly more complex referring expressions 
(e.g. µthe big marble¶) in the Naïve condition (where complex referring terms were necessary 
to avoid ambiguity) than in the Knowledgeable condition. In this sense, their production 
behaviour ties in with their interpretation behaviour; they have the competence to take social 
common ground into account to drive verbal reference. However, the interaction effect found 
for production indicates that children with ASD were less able than TD peers to select a 
referring term based on whether a specific listener had previously shared the experience of 
constructing that particular toy.   
 
Could the interpretation task have been resolved via a sub-mentalising heuristic? 
In Exp 1 (reference interpretation), our control task ruled out the possibility that children with 
ASD might in the experimental task have simply blindly associated a particular experimenter 
with a particular activity. In this control task, the Requester had sat next to one of the two 
activities, but this association between Requester and activity was not sufficient to enable 
children in either group to interpret the ambiguous pronoun as referring to this activity. 
Moreover, it also cannot be the case that, for the experimental task, the children with ASD 
simply tracked the ambiguous pronoun back to the noun phrase (activity) which they had 
most recently heard (see Arnold et al., 2009). This is because for half the experimental trials 
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per child, this would have led to false assumption that the target was the activity in which 
they had engaged with the non-requesting experimenter.  
 
Exploring competence versus performance  
Children with ASD thus can, on the one hand, demonstrate a competence for taking listener 
informational needs into account (i.e. significant difference between conditions for 
production task) but are nonetheless significantly less able to demonstrate this, in comparison 
to well-matched typical peers (as evidenced by the interaction effect). There are many 
reasons why the performance of children with ASD might be vulnerable, particularly if the 
task involves holding various elements in mind while planning a response, as was the case for 
our production task (e.g. Sikora, Roelofs, Hermans, & Knoors 2016).  
 Indeed, we might have found a between-groups difference if we had used a more 
complex interpretation task, such as one with several foils, or with several interlocutors, or a 
greater length of time between the shared experience and the test request.  However, a 
between-groups difference in such a paradigm would not be due to a difference in the ability 
per se of the children with ASD to take in account the experience shared with a particular 
interlocutor; rather, it would be due to performance limitations, presumably relating to 
executive functioning or memory.  
 A good illustration of the difference between competence and performance in the 
interpretation of verbal reference can be seen in several studies of neurotypical adults (e.g.  
Cane, Ferguson & Apperly, 2017). These studies all manipulated level one visual perspective 
taking, for which no-one doubts neurotypical adult competence. Nonetheless, neurotypical 
adults make some errors in the SULYLOHJHGJURXQGFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHVHµGLUHFWRUWDVN¶
paradigms. Their µHJRFHQWULFHUURUV¶ relate to inhibitory control (Brown-Schmidt, 2009) and 
cognitive flexibility (Lin, Eply & Keysar, 2010). Thus, while neurotypical adults have the 
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competence to perform these reference interpretation tasks, they also have performance 
limitations. Future studies will need to explore why individuals with ASD seem on average to 
be more susceptible than the average neuro-typical individual to performance issues.   
 
The manipulation of social common ground 
 The aspect of social common ground which we manipulated is relatively basic; TD 
18-month-olds are capable of taking this into account to interpret pointing reference (Liebal 
et al., 2009). Nonetheless, our interpretation task (Exp 1) required some kind of implicit 
consideration of the knowledge to which a specific interlocutor had access and moreover, this 
knowledge cannot be based (as in previous ASD reference interpretation studies) on level one 
visual perspective-taking because when the Requester entered the room in the experimental 
trials, she could see neither the target nor the foil. Thus, we are the first to demonstrate that 5- 
to 7-year-olds with ASD can take interlocutor-specific knowledge into account in order to 
interpret reference. Indeed, the fact that the children with ASD showed a significant 
difference between the Knowledgeable and Naïve Listener conditions in Study 2 (Production) 
shows that they also demonstrated in production the competence to consider this when 
selecting a referring expression.  
Liebal et al. (2009) interpreted the behaviour of the infants in their original study as 
LQGLFDWLQJWKDWWKH\ZHUHWDNLQJµVKDUHGH[SHULHQFH¶LQDFFRXQWWRLQWHUSUHWUHIHUHQFH. If our 
group with ASD were doing so, this could be problematic for claims by Tomasello et al. 
(2005) that children with ASD do not demonstrate shared intentionality.  
We exercise caution in this regard. It is possible that our ASD group would still have 
selected the target, if they had merely observed the Requester constructing the toy. If this 
were the case, then the skills needed by FKLOGUHQZLWK$6'WRµSDVV¶the interpretation task 
would merely be intention-reading (see Carpenter, Pennington & Rogers, 2002), social co-
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ordination (Melis, Hare & Tomasello, 2006) and a willingness to help others (see Liebal, 
Colombi, Warneken & Tomasello, 2008, for autism).  
  Furthermore, there are many ways in which social common ground can be 
established and drawn upon when interpreting and producing verbal reference. In daily life, 
this often involves recalling shared experience over an extended period of time. It also often 
involves detecting not only what the interlocutor knows but also what he or she is likely to 
enjoy and / or find salient (e.g. Clark, Schreuder & Buttrick, 1983). This could be an area of 
difficulty in ASD since many individuals appear not to experience stimuli salience in a neuro-
typical way (see e.g. 2¶1HLOO	+DSSé, 2000). It is certainly yet to be shown that individuals 
with ASD acknowledge that a joint commitment has been made towards a shared goal (see 
Tomasello & Hamann, 2012), which would be a stronger test of shared intentionality.  
  
Summary 
We have shown that children with ASD take interlocutor-specific prior experience 
into account in verbal reference interpretation and (to some extent) production. However, 
they lag behind well-matched typical peers in the degree to which they utilise information 
about prior shared experience in reference production. Future studies are needed to explore 
the precise components which lead to these disproportionate difficulties. This knowledge is 
essential for strategies to enable individuals with ASD to improve communication with 
family, peers and in the classroom. 
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